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April 16, 1991
Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

State v. Simpson, No. 900356-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
For purposes of the court's calendaring and prompt disposition
of this appeal, please note that the State concedes in its brief
that defendant Simpson's conviction should be reversed based on the
ineffectiveness of his trial counsel.
Sincerely,

ANNINA M. MITCHELL
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
Copy to:

Joseph C. Fratto
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

CURTIS GALEN SIMPSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900356-CA

Category No, 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from judgment entered upon a jury
verdict convicting Appellant Curtis Galen Simpson of attempted
escape, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, §
76-8-309 (1990) and Utah Code Ann- § 76-4-101 (1990).
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals over the appeal is
based on Utah Code Ann- § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF DISPOSITIVE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel by
his trial attorney's requested jury instruction purporting to
state the elements of attempted escape but instead omitting
essential statutory elements of the crime?

This determination

presents a mixed question of law and fact.

State v. Templin, 149

Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Curtis Galen Simpson was charged with escape,
a violation of Utah Code Ann, § 76-8-309 (1990) (R. 004). The
statute prohibits "escape from official custody" and makes the
crime a second degree felony if the actor escapes from
confinement in the Utah State Prison.

A person is deemed to be

confined in the Utah State Prison "if he has been sentenced and
committed and the sentence has not been terminated or voided and
the prisoner is not on parole."
(1990).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(3)

After a jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court,

defendant was convicted of attempted escape (R. 0095 at 127; R.
80)/ a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6401 (1990).

Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Pat B.

Brian to serve a consecutive sentence of not more than five years
(R. 81).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At trial in May 1990, the State's case-in-chief
consisted of the following stipulated facts: (1) defendant was
serving a term in the Utah State Prison of from zero to five
years for theft, and had not had his sentence terminated and was
not on parole; (2) defendant missed the 12:00 p.m. count at the
Orange Street Community Correctional Center on August 7, 1989,
and could not be located; and (3) approximately eight hours
later, defendant was picked up by authorities in California (R.
0095 at 46-47).
After this stipulation was read to the jury, the State
-2-

rested (R. 0095 at 47), and defendant took the stand in his own
defense.

He contended that his flight to California was

justified by compulsion to escape the threats of a Mexican man,
known to him as Weasel, who had approached him at the Crossroads
Mall in the first few days of August while defendant was out of
the Orange Street correctional facility looking for work (R.0095
at 60-61).

Weasel had asked defendant if he was in a halfway

house and if he had ever testified against "Tiger."
denied doing so, and Weasel said he knew better.

Defendant

Weasel said

defendant would have to come up with $1,000 per month or be
physically harmed, and defendant ended the encounter by leaving
(R. 0095 at 61-62).
While in prison in the spring of 1989, defendant had
been

placed in protective custody by being locked down 24 hours

a day after expressing his concern to prison officials about his
physical well-being because of the presence at the prison of
Danny ("Tiger") Lucero and his gang (R. 0095 at 50-51).
Defendant had testified against Lucero after Lucero slit
defendant's throat in 1982 (R. 0095 at 70-72).

After his

complaints to prison officials, defendant was transferred to
three different facilities within the prison.

At the third, he

was approached by three Mexican men who asked if he knew "Tiger"
Lucero (R. 0095 at 52). When defendant denied it, the men said
they knew he had testified against Lucero, and told defendant to
"watch his back" and that his life was in danger (R. 0095 at 53).
Defendant was transferred to the Orange Street halfway house in
-3-

late July 1989, and was approached by Weasel nine or ten days
later (R, 0095 at 61),
After his first encounter with Weasel, defendant went
to a counselor at the halfway house to report the incident.

The

counselor told him to be careful, but that there was nothing he
could do about it (R. 0095 at 56).

On August 7, 1989, defendant

was approached by Weasel and two other Mexican men while he was
waiting for a bus to Bountiful (R. 0095 at 56-57).

Weasel asked

if defendant had any money for him, and defendant indicated he
did not.

Defendant got away by boarding his bus while the men

hollered at him, "We will get you" (R. 0095 at 65). He went to

his sister's

house in Bountiful

(R. 0095 at 56-58)

to see her and

her children before his nearby appointment about a job, although
he had not previously arranged to see her then (R. 0095 at 64).
He asked for and received money from her and took another bus to
the Ogden airport and flew to California on the spur of the
moment, prompted by the confrontation by the three men at the bus
stop (R. 0095 at 38, 69-70).

He claimed that Utah corrections

officials were not taking care of his well-being and that he did
not know how to go to them and get help (R. 0095 at 58).
The State put on Colleen Bay, defendant's half-sister,
to rebut his assertion that he only impulsively decided to leave
Utah on the morning of August 7 after the threatening incident at
the bus stop.

Bay testified that he had contacted her some time

before Friday, August 4, and arranged to come to her home at
10:00 a.m. on August 7 to pick up his $15,000 inheritance check
-4-

(R. 0095 at 90-91).

After she gave it to him that morning, he

went to a Centerville bank and obtained $3,000 in cash and the
balance in a cashier's check (R. 0095 at 94).
In addition to being instructed on the elements of
escape and the statutory defense of compulsion in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-302 (1990) (Instructions 19, 21-23; R. 64, 66-68), the
jury was also given Instruction 20 (R. 65) ,l

an instruction

requested by defendant that purported to enumerate the elements
of attempted escape as:
1. That on or about the 7th day of August,
1989, the defendant, CURTIS GALEN SIMPSON,
was in official custody at the Orange Street
Community Correctional Center.
2. That on or about the 7th day of August,
1989, the defendant attempted to escape from
such official custody.
3. That in doing so the defendant acted
intentionally or knowingly.
The jury convicted defendant of attempted escape (R. 80).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State does not dispute that the trial court's
failure to instruct a jury on the elements of the crime of
attempt, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990), is an
error of federal constitutional dimensions. Although not raised
by counsel for defendant on appeal2, it is the State's position
1

Instructions 19 and 20 are reprinted in Appellant's brief,
Appendix B.
2

This omission is puzzling since substitute appellate
counsel was belatedly appointed precisely because of the possible
existence of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial involving
the attempted escape elements instruction. Appellant's Motion,
Stipulation and Order for Extension of Time for Preparation of
Appellant's Brief (filed January 10, 1991).
-5-

that trial counsel's submission of the constitutionally deficient
instruction on the elements of attempted escape constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution.

For this reason,

defendant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded
for new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIME OF ATTEMPTED ESCAPE.
In State v. Harmon, 712 P. 2d 291 (Utah 19.86) (per
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court erred
in failing to instruct a jury that an attempt to commit robbery
included the specific elements of attempt set forth in Utah Code
Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990), which provides in relevant part:
(1) For purposes of this part a person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the offense,
he engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of the
offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does
not constitute a substantial step unless it
is strongly corroborative of the actor's
intent to commit the offense.
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on its previous
holding in State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980), that it was
reversible error for the trial court not to instruct on all the
basic elements of the crime of which the defendant was convicted.
See also State v. Stewart, 35 Wash. App. 552, 667 P.2d 1139, 1141

6-

(1983) (failure to instruct on statutory elements of attempt was
"error of constitutional magnitude") (cited in Harmon, 712 P.2d
at 292 n.l). 3
Instruction 20, like the instruction in Harmon, merely
inserted the words "attempted to" before the words "escape from
such official custody" that parrot those in the instruction on
the elements of escape, Instruction 19.

Instruction 20 did not

inform the jury, as Harmon requires, that in order to convict
defendant of attempted escape it had to find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, (1) that his conduct constituted a substantial step toward
commission of the offense of escape, and (2) that the substantial
step must be strongly corroborative of the defendant's intent to
commit the primary offense.

See Harmon, 712 P.2d at 291-92.

The

State therefore concedes that the instruction on the elements of
the lesser included offense of attempted escape, Instruction 20,
is erroneous.
Counsel for defendant on appeal merely asserts—with no
citation to supporting authority and no legal argument or
analysis—that reversal of the conviction in this case is
required even though there was no objection in the trial court to
3

Although not expressed in the opinions, the constitutional
error found in Harmon and Stewart apparently flows from the
holding in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), that, in
order to satisfy due process, a criminal conviction must be
supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime. See Chambers v. People, 682
P.2d 1173, 1175 (Colo. 1984) (en banc). Failure to instruct on
the basic elements of the crime of which defendant was convicted
creates the risk that the jury did not make the findings that the
constitution requires.
-7-

the unconstitutional omissions in Instruction 20 (Brief of
Appellant at 5-6). This case does not, however, involve a mere
failure to object under Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

C£. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).

It involves the affirmative act of defendant's trial counsel
submitting Instruction 20 to the court for delivery to the jury.
In such circumstances, some courts have applied the doctrine of
invited error and barred a defendant from raising on appeal a
constitutional challenge to an instruction he proposed.

E.g..

State v. Tassler, 159 Ariz. 183, 765 P.2d 1007 (1988) (reasonable
doubt instruction); State v. Henderson, 114 Wash.2d 867, 792 P.2d
514 (1990) (en banc) (failure to instruct on all elements of
crime of which convicted); see also People v. Akers, 746 P.2d
1381 (Colo. App. 1987) (failure to instruct on elements of escape
where defendant opposed giving of escape instruction and was
ultimately convicted of attempted escape).
"The doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent
an accused from gaining reversal on appeal because of an error
made by the trial court at his behest."

People v. Wickersham, 32

Cal.3d 307, 650 P.2d 311, 323, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 (1982); accord
State v. Prouse, 244 Kan. 292, 767 P.2d 1308 (1989).

Thus, if

defense counsel expressly leads the trial court into error as a
deliberate tactical move, the defendant cannot complain about the
error on appeal. Wickersham, 650 P.2d at 325.

But where defense

counsel acts out of neglect or ignorance in requesting an
erroneous instruction, the doctrine of invited error should not
-8-

bar an appellate court's consideration of the alleged error.

See

id.; State v. Dozier, 163 W.Va. 192, 195, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555
(1979).

Furthermore, the general rule regarding invited error

should yield if its application would deprive the accused of his
constitutional right to due process.

State v. Hiqgins, 243 Kan.

48, 755 P.2d 12 (1988); Dozier, 255 S.E.2d at 555; Henderson, 792
P.2d at 518-20 (Utter, J., dissenting).
In the instant case, there was no legitimate tactical
reason for defense counsel to propose an elements instruction
that deprived defendant of due process and the record reveals no
intention by defense counsel to submit the defective instruction
to gain some strategic advantage at trial.

Under these peculiar

circumstances, where it appears that counsel negligently led the
trial court to err, it is the State's position that an exception
to the invited error doctrine is appropriate and the Court should
not refuse to consider the merits of defendant's constitutional
challenge to Instruction 20.
POINT II
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE
HIS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN PROPOSING AN
INSTRUCTION THAT OMITTED THE STATUTORY
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED ESCAPE.
As noted above, the State concedes it was error for the
trial court to give an elements instruction for attempted escape
without providing the elements of an attempt set forth in section
76-4-101(1) and (2). In light of the fact that the instruction
was drafted by and requested by defense counsel (Brief of

-9-

Appellant at 4), it is appropriate to consider whether counsel's
action in so doing violated defendant's sixth amendment right to
effective assistance of trial counsel, even though the issue is
not raised or argued in these terms in Appellant's brief.

See

note 2, supra.
In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a
defendant must show both that counsel rendered deficient
performance and that prejudice resulted, i.e., if counsel had not
acted in a deficient manner, there is a reasonable probability of
a more favorable result for the defendant.

State v. Carter/ 776

P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118-19
(Utah 1989).

To be judged deficient under the first prong of

this test, counsel's performance must fall below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment.

State v. Templin,

149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah 1990); Carter, 776 P.2d at 893.
Although legitimate strategic choices by an attorney will not
normally fall beneath this standard of reasonableness, State v.
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct.
3270 (1990), there is simply no legitimate tactical basis for
counsel's request of a constitutionally defective elements
instruction.

In light of Harmon, it is uncontrovertible that

defense counsel's actions in preparing and requesting Instruction
20 fall below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment.
With regard to the "prejudice" prong of the test for
ineffectiveness of counsel, a reasonable probability of a more
-10-

favorable result for the defendant has been defined as "a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Templin, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).

In this casef the State

cannot in good faith contend that defendant was not prejudiced by
his counsel's deficient performance.

Defendant did not merely

leave it to the State to prove the elements of the charge against
him; he interposed compulsion as a complete defense to the crime
of escape.

See State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986)

(enumerating the common law qualifications on the compulsion
defense codified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (1990)).
Notwithstanding defendant's stipulation that on August
7, 1989, he was serving an unterminated prison sentence and was
not on parole and that he missed the headcount at the halfway
house and was picked up in California eight hours later (R. 0095
at 46-47), the jury found him not guilty of the crime of escape
but guilty of attempted escape.

This verdict does not

necessarily indicate the jury's complete rejection of defendant's
compulsion claim.

Without an instruction correctly setting forth

the elements that had to be found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to convict defendant of attempted escape, it is
reasonably likely that the jury viewed an attempt conviction as a
permissible compromise choice between the harshness of an escape
conviction and complete exoneration because of duress.

Thus, the

State believes there is a reasonable probability that the jury
would have acquitted defendant if properly instructed on the
-11-

statutory elements of attempt.
In light of its concession that both prongs of the
Strickland test for an ineffectiveness claim are met in this
case, the State agrees that defendant is entitled to a new
trial/
CONCLUSION
Because defendant was denied his sixth amendment right
to the effective assistance of counsel at trial, the State
requests that this Court reverse the judgment of conviction and
remand for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

^fr? day of April, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

ANNINA M. MITCHELL
Assistant Attorney General
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The State therefore considers it unnecessary to address
the merits of defendant's claim that voir dire was impermissibly
restricted by the trial court.
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